Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TUNIS 01094 01 OF 02 151343Z ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 MC-02 AID-05 SS-15 SP-02 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00 IGA-02 EB-08 EUR-12 IO-13 NSC-05 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 /094 W

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R 151215Z FEB 77 FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5788 SECDEF WASHDC INFO USCINCEUR CINCUSNAVEUR

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 1 OF 2 TUNIS 1094

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR TS MASS

SUBJECT: TUNISIAN DEFENSE MINISTER MAKES NEW REQUESTS

REF: CHUSLOT 021325Z FEB 77

1. SUMMARY: DURING LONG TALK WITH DEFENSE MINISTER FARHAT AND SECRETARY OF STATE FOR DEFENSE BENNOUR FEBRUARY 11 ON MULTITUDE OF SUBJECTS OF MUTUAL INTEREST I EMERGED WITH MY HORIZONS BROADENED AS WELL AS WITH REQUESTS FOR ACTION ON A SERIES OF NEW OR RESURRECTED ITEMS WITHIN FRAMEWORK OF OUR MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. EACH OF THE NEW REQUESTS, DESCRIBED HERE ONLY IN BROAD BRUSH, WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF FOLLOW-UP MESSAGES THROUGH USLOT/DOD CHANNELS. EXPECTING THE WORST IN LIGHT OF THE UGLY BOMBSHELL WE WERE FORCED TO DROP RECENTLY ON OUR GOOD TUNISIAN FRIENDS, DUE TO OUR "REPLACEMENT COST" POLICY OF PROCUREMENT, I AM HAPPY TO REPORT THAT I MANAGED TO DEFUSE THAT PARTICULAR ISSUE BY SOME FAST TALKING, BUT THAT I HOPE IN RETURN FOR SOME EARLY FAVORABLE ACTION ON A LINE OF NEW LEVIES UPON US BY GOT. WASHINGTON PEOPLE WHO KNOW THE TUNISIANS, CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TUNIS 01094 01 OF 02 151343Z

HOWEVER, WILL NOT BE SURPRISED TO READ BELOW HOW WELL THE GOT HAS LEARNED THE EXPENSIVE LESSON OF OUR "REPLACEMENT COST" POLICY AND TURNED IT AROUND TO THEIR OWN HOPED-FOR ADVANTAGE. END SUMMARY.

2. AMMO COST OVERRUN: PRIMED WITH A SOLID HALF-HOUR PRIOR BRIEFING BY USLOT ON ALL THE DETAILS OF THE

AMMUNITION ORDER FOR 1.2 MILLION DOLLARS WHICH WOUND UP COSTING THE GOT ONE AND ONE-HALF MILLION DOLLARS, I WAITED FOR ONE SOLID HOUR BEFORE MY POLITE HOSTS, ABDALLAH FARHAT AND AHMED BENNOUR, RAISED THE ISSUE ALMOST APOLOGETICALLY. I TALKED LIKE MAD FOR FIVE FULL MINUTES TO IMPRESS THEM WITH MY GRASP OF THE SMALLEST DETAIL AND DATE IN THE TWO-INCH THICK FILE ON THE SHAMEFUL SUBJECT. I RECOUNTED MY PERSONAL PITCH FOR REDRESS TO HIGHEST WASHINGTON 9);34. IN THE END THEY CAPITULATED. FARHAT SAID HE WOULD SEND US A LETTER AGREEINGLTO THE OPTION OF A REDUCED AMOUNT OF AMMUNITION. USLOT WILL SHORTLY INFORM DOD WHAT ITEMS SHOULD BE REMOVED FROM OHE ONE-YEAR-LATE SHIPMENT.

3. CHAPARRAL SYSTEM: FOREGOING ITEM OF BUSINESS WAS FOLLOWED AFTER POLITE INTERVAL BY COMPARING OF NOTES ON WHERE WE STOOD ON CHAPARRAL/VULCAN AA MISSILE SYSTEM. BENNOUR THEN SAID THAT TUNISIAN MILITARY WERE AWARE THAT GOT WAS RECEIVING CURRENT CHAPARRAL "B" (MIM-72A) SYSTEM WHEREAS THEY WERE PAYING FOR US REPLACEMENT COSTS FOR CHAPARRAL "C" (MIM-72C) SYSTEM EXISTENCE OF WHICH THEY HAD BECOME AWARE. HE SAID HE WOULD BE SENDING US IN NEXT FEW DAYS A FORMAL REQUEST THAT MODEL "C" MISSILES BE PROVIDED TO TUNISIA RATHER THAN MODEL "B". I REPLIED THAT, WHILE I WOULD BE WILLING TO FORWARD MOD'S REQUEST TO WASHINGTON, IT MIGHT BE MANY YEARS BEFORE MODEL "C" WOULD BE EXPORTABLE. BENNOUR SAID THAT, TO CONTRARY, HE KNEW MODEL "C" WAS CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 TUNIS 01094 01 OF 02 151343Z

ALREADY BEING EXPORTED. BEING UNSURE OF MY GROUND IN FACE OF BENNOUR'S ASSURED STATEMENT I SIMPLY UNDERTOOK TO HAVE HIS REQUEST STUDIED. IT WOULD BE NICE IF WE COULD REWARD THEM WITH A PLEASANT SURPRISE, ESPECIALLY SINCE THE MISSILES THEY NEED AREN'T PROGRAMMED FOR DELIVERY BEFORE MAY 1979 ANYWAY.

4. SOVIET OFFER: FARHAT MENTIONED THAT TUNISIA WOULD HOST A VISIT IN LATE MARCH BY ADMINARL GORSHKOV, FIRST DEPUTY MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND USSR NAVY CHIEF OF STAFF. TO PUT ME AT EASE HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A RETURN COURTESY VISIT TO TUNISIAN CNO ADMIRAL JEDIDI, ADDING THAT OORSHKOV WOULD "BE TAKEN DOWN SOUTH TO SEE THE DESERT" SINCE THERE WAS "NITHING IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS WITH HIM". BENNOUR THEN SAID THAT, WHILE JEDIDI VISITED USSR LAST OCTOBER ABOARD FLAGSHIP PRESIDENT BOURGUIBA, AFTER DISCUSSION ABOUT TUNISIA'S VULNERABILITY TO HOSTILE AIRCRAFT, GORSHKOV OFFERED TO LOAD AS MANY SAM-7 MISSILES AS GOT WANTED ABOARD FLAGSHIP. BENNOUR

AND FARHAT SAID OFFER WAS TEMPTING AND WOULD FILL REAL TUNISIAN NEED BUT THAT GOT WOULD MUCH PREFER US REDEYE MISSILES, WHICH UNFORTUNATELY, WE WERE UNWILLING TO SELL THEM. LOYALLY I EXPLAINED US POLICY ON REDEYES (EASY TRANSPORTABILITY, USE BY TERRORISTS, ETC.) WHICH THEY'D HEARD BEFORE. THEY SAID THEY COULD BUY A READY SUPPLY OF SAM-7'S FROM THE PLO ANYTIME FOR THE ASKING AND THEN COMPARED OUR REDEYE POLICY TO OUR NOW-ABANDONED POLICY ON M-16 RIFLES. SOONER OR LATER WE WOULD LET OUR FRIENDS HAVE REDEYES WHY NOT NOW? WOULD I PLEASE

ASK WASHINGTON AGAIN IF A SMALL NUMBER OF REDEYE MISSILES COULD NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE TO FRIENDLY TUNISIA? I PROMISED TO DO SO, BUT TOLD THEM I HAD NO REAL HOPE FOR GETTING A FAVORABLE ANSWER FOR THEM.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 TUNIS 01094 02 OF 02 151353Z ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 MC-02 AID-05 SS-15 SP-02 ACDA-07 OMB-01 TRSE-00 IGA-02 EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-07 NSAE-00 EUR-12 IO-13 NSC-05 /094 W

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R 151215Z FEB 77 FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5789 SECDEF WASHDC INFO USCINCEUR CINCUSNAVEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TUNIS 1094

(I HAVE SINCE LEARNED THAT REDEYE PRODUCTION HAS CEASED; ANDLI PLAN, UNLESS DEPARTMENT ADVISES TO CONTRARY, TO HAVE CHUSLOT INFORM TUNISIAN MOD THAT NO POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING REDEYE.)

5. SURPLUS UNIFORMS: SOME MONTHS AGO FARHAT HAD ASKED ME INFORMALLY WHETHER WE COULD SELL GOT "SURPLUS AMERICAN UNIFORMS". I REPLIED THAT I DID NOT HAVE AN ANSWER TO THAT BUT SUGGESTED THAT HE FIRST CONSULT A TUNISIAN BUSINESSMAN WHO IS ONE OF WORLD'S LARGEST DEALERS IN US SECOND-HAND CLOTHING. FARHAT TOLD ME THAT HE HAD CHECKED INTO MY SUGGESTION BUT HAD CONCLUDED THAT GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENT WOULD BE

MORESATISFACTORY. I DID NOT GO INTO DETAILS REGARDING TYPES OF UNIFORMS HE HAD IN MIND BUT PROMISED TO HAVE USLOT DISCUSS HIS REQUEST WITH MOD STAFF.

6. BORDER SECURITY AND REMOTE-SENSING: NEXT FARHAT MENTIONED THAT MOD WAS AWARE THAT USAID HAD RECENTLY SENT A SPECIALIST IN SATELLITE REMOTE-SENSING FOR AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL USE TO TUNIS FOR TALKS. AS I WAS AWARE, HE SAID, THERE HAD BEEN SOMEWHAT CONFIDENTIAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 TUNIS 01094 02 OF 02 151353Z

DESULTORY TALK OF SATELLITE CAPABILITY FOR WATCHING TUNISIA'S BORDERS, PARTICULARLY THE LONG SAHARAN BORDER WITH LIBYA. EXCEPT FOR CAMEL CORPS AND OCCASIONAL TAF OVERFLIGHTS TUNISIA HAD NO EFFECTIVE MEANS OF BEING SURE CARAVANS FROM LIBYA WERE NOT CARRYING GUNS AND EXPLOSIVES INTO TUNISIA ACROSS SIEVE-LIKE FRONTIER. WITH CURRENT BUILD-UP OF LIBYAN BASES AT EL WOTIA AND GHADAMES GOT'S NERVOUSNESS WAS INCREASING. HE WANTED TO PRESENT USG WITH A FORMAL REQUEST FOR VISIT BY AN EXPERT TO DETERMINE WHAT, IF ANY, HELP US SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY WOULD BE TO GOT IN MEETING PROBLEM OF BORDER SECURITY. I REPLIED THAT THIS WAS A FIELD IN WHICH I WAS FAR FROM AN EXPERT BUT I DOUBTED, EVEN IF SATELLITE WAS AVAILABLE, WHETHER CAMEL CARAVANS WOULD BE DISCERNIBLE. FARHAT SAID HE WAS WILLING TO CONCLUDE THIS MIGHT BE A BLIND ALLEY, BUT HOPED WE COULD PROVIDE SOMEONE TO LOOK INTO GOT'S PROBLEM. SO SAYING HE REACHED FOR A LETTER HE HAD ALREADY SIGNED FORMALIZING THE REQUEST. I ACCEPTED THE LETTER AND UNDERTOOK TO GET HIM AN EARLY RESPONSE (ALTHOUGH I RECOGNIZED THAT GOT ACCESS TO DESIRED SATELLITE IMAGERY IS PROBABLY OUT OF THE QUESTION).

7. A GREAT DEAL OF FURTHER DISCUSSION ALSO TOOK PLACE ON LIBYAN-SOVIET MILITARY AND NAVAL COLLABORATION, QADHAFI'S MOTIVATIONS, HIS MENTAL STABILITY, ETC. NONE OF THESE RESULTED IN FURTHER REQUESTS FOR ACTION. THIS MESSAGE WILL SERVE TO ALERT STATE AND DOD ON THE NATURE OF SEVERAL CONCRETE REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE. MULCAHY

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